Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529843
 


 



Tying


Dennis W. Carlton


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Waldman


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

August 1, 2008

3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1859, 2008

Abstract:     
This chapter first reviews economic theories for why firms tie their products and then discusses our views concerning what this review implies concerning optimal antitrust policy for tying cases. The review considers efficiency rationales for tying, price discrimination rationales, and various exclusionary rationales that have recently been put forth. The chapter specifically discusses the Chicago School view that tying should raise no antitrust concern and explains when that logic breaks down. In our discussion of optimal antitrust policy concerning tying, ourmain point is that, because of the prevalence of efficiency-driven tying in real world markets and the difficulty that courts have in reliably identifying all the welfare consequences of a tie, in general there should be a high hurdle required for intervention in tying cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

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Date posted: January 1, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Carlton , Dennis W. and Waldman, Michael, Tying (August 1, 2008). 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1859, 2008 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529843

Contact Information

Dennis W. Carlton (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Michael Waldman
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8631 (Phone)
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