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Tranching in the Syndicated Loan Market


Douglas Cumming


York University - Schulich School of Business

Joseph A. McCahery


Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Armin Schwienbacher


Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

March 15, 2010

Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 009/2010

Abstract:     
We use data comprising over 100,000 loans from 115 countries during 1995-2009 to examine factors that affect the extent of loan tranching, and the range of tranche spreads. The data show five factors that drive them: asymmetric information, borrower risk, transaction costs, the presence of institutional investors, and the legal system. Tranching is more extensive and generates greater differences in spreads between tranches of a same loan when asymmetric information and risk are more pronounced. Economic and institutional factors driving tranching are more directly applicable to non-investment grade loans. For developing countries, the data highlight factors that affect the extent of tranching but such factors show little sensitivity to the pricing of the relative spreads.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Loan, Debt finance, Tranche, Law and finance

JEL Classification: G2, G21, K22

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Date posted: January 6, 2010 ; Last revised: November 4, 2010

Suggested Citation

Cumming, Douglas J., McCahery, Joseph A. and Schwienbacher, Armin, Tranching in the Syndicated Loan Market (March 15, 2010). Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 009/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1531567

Contact Information

Douglas J. Cumming
York University - Schulich School of Business ( email )
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.venturecapitalprivateequitycontracting.com/
Joseph A. McCahery
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Duisenberg School of Finance ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Armin Schwienbacher (Contact Author)
Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
Lille
France
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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