On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
University of Chicago - Department of Economics
November 1, 2009
Milton Friedman Institute Working Paper No. 2009-09
We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally-complete metrizable semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based upon contractibility rather than convexity of best reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47working papers series
Date posted: January 8, 2010 ; Last revised: February 23, 2012
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