Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533209
 
 

References (44)



 


 



On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas


Christian A. L. Hilber


London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment; Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC)

Frederic Robert-Nicoud


University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

December 2009

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7604

Abstract:     
We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group (via increasing property prices) but hurt the latter (via increasing development costs). More desirable locations are more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, more regulated. Using an IV approach that directly follows from our model we find strong and robust support for our predictions. The data provide weak or no support for alternative hypotheses whereby regulations reflect the wishes of the majority of households or efficiency motives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: housing supply, land ownership, land use regulations, zoning

JEL Classification: H7, Q15, R52

working papers series


Date posted: January 11, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hilber, Christian A. L. and Robert-Nicoud, Frederic, On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas (December 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7604. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533209

Contact Information

Christian A. L. Hilber (Contact Author)
London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment ( email )
Houghton Street
WC2A 2AE London
United Kingdom
Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC) ( email )
United Kingdom
Frederic L. Robert-Nicoud
University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )
40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 379 8272 (Phone)
+41 22 379 8293 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/staff/robert/home.html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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