Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics
Princeton University - Department of Economics
January 8, 2010
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.
Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies
JEL Classification: C79, D82working papers series
Date posted: January 10, 2010
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