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Modular Confines of Mobile Networks: Are Iphones Iphony?


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

May 7, 2009

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-01
3rd Annual Conference on the Law and Economics of Innovation, May 2009

Abstract:     
Strategic investments by wireless carriers and others are generating rapid development of the “mobile ecology,” increasing modularity even while embracing and extending vertical controls. Coordination among complementary asset owners and simultaneous rivalry among platforms suggests that the process of creative destruction is robust. Moreover, innovation “at the edge” is vibrant, with smartphone suppliers Research in Motion (Blackberry), Apple (iPhone), Google (gPhone), among others, driving carrier strategies. That vertical network policies help generate welfare gains is apparent via revealed consumer preferences, the advanced state of technology under “strong bundling” in Japan, and the fact that even ostensibly “open” platforms retain an important measure of vertical control, efficiencies yielding value in rivalry against competing platforms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: AOL, AT&T, application platforms, business models, Carterfone, cellular, choice, FCC, Federal Communications Commission, marketplace, Microsoft, monopoly, Motorola, Nokia, Palm, price system, regulation, Ronald Coase, Timothy Wu, vertical integration

JEL Classification: K23, L14, L26, L51, L63, L96

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Date posted: January 8, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W., Modular Confines of Mobile Networks: Are Iphones Iphony? (May 7, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-01; 3rd Annual Conference on the Law and Economics of Innovation, May 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533441

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

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