Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534586
 
 

References (18)



 
 

Citations (9)



 


 



Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax


Joel B. Slemrod


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christian Traxler


Hertie School of Governance; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

December 2010

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/04

Abstract:     
We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government’s investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base. We characterize the optimal level of observability and derive a new expression for the optimal progressivity, which – in addition to the standard equity efficiency trade-off – accounts for the limited accuracy of an income tax system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: optimal linear income taxation, observability, tax enforcement

JEL Classification: H21, H11, D8

working papers series


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Date posted: January 11, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Slemrod, Joel B. and Traxler, Christian, Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax (December 2010). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/04. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534586 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1534586

Contact Information

Joel B. Slemrod
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Room A2120
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-936-3914 (Phone)
734-763-4032 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Christian Traxler (Contact Author)
Hertie School of Governance ( email )
Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )
Poschingerstr. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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