Redistributive Justice - Entitlements and Inequality in a Third-Party Dictator Game
George Mason University
Kevin A. McCabe
George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University School of Law
Maria Pia Paganelli
January 11, 2010
The experiment presented here provides evidence that, in the presence of first possession and inequality, the degree to which a third-party re-distributor honors preexisting entitlements is bounded. Using a third-party redistributive task, the design examines how impartial decision makers redistribute the income of an advantaged stakeholder to a disadvantaged stakeholder. The results show that redistribution significantly decreases when entitlements to income are legitimized either by having an endowed stakeholder earn the right to his advantageous position or by having him earn his income. When both rights and income are earned, however, redistribution does not decrease further.
Keywords: distributive justice, redistribution, redistributive preferences, impartiality, other people's money, entitlementsworking papers series
Date posted: January 12, 2010
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