Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534934
 
 

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Redistributive Justice - Entitlements and Inequality in a Third-Party Dictator Game


David Chavanne


George Mason University

Kevin A. McCabe


George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University School of Law

Maria Pia Paganelli


Trinity University

January 11, 2010


Abstract:     
The experiment presented here provides evidence that, in the presence of first possession and inequality, the degree to which a third-party re-distributor honors preexisting entitlements is bounded. Using a third-party redistributive task, the design examines how impartial decision makers redistribute the income of an advantaged stakeholder to a disadvantaged stakeholder. The results show that redistribution significantly decreases when entitlements to income are legitimized either by having an endowed stakeholder earn the right to his advantageous position or by having him earn his income. When both rights and income are earned, however, redistribution does not decrease further.

Keywords: distributive justice, redistribution, redistributive preferences, impartiality, other people's money, entitlements

working papers series


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Date posted: January 12, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Chavanne, David and McCabe, Kevin A. and Paganelli, Maria Pia, Redistributive Justice - Entitlements and Inequality in a Third-Party Dictator Game (January 11, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534934

Contact Information

David Chavanne (Contact Author)
George Mason University ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Kevin A. McCabe
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
Maria Pia Paganelli
Trinity University ( email )
Dept. of Economics
One Trinity Place
San Antonio, TX 78212
United States
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