Are Self-Made Men Made Equally? An Experimental Test of Impartial Redistribution and Perceptions of Self-Determination
Connecticut College - Economics Department
Kevin A. McCabe
George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty
Maria Pia Paganelli
June 11, 2014
The experiment presented here provides evidence that, in the presence of first possession and inequality, the degree to which a third-party re-distributor honors preexisting entitlements is bounded. Using a third-party redistributive task, the design examines how impartial decision makers redistribute the income of an advantaged stakeholder to a disadvantaged stakeholder. The results show that redistribution significantly decreases when entitlements to income are legitimized either by having an endowed stakeholder earn the right to his advantageous position or by having him earn his income. When both rights and income are earned, however, redistribution does not decrease further.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: distributive justice, redistribution, redistributive preferences, impartiality, other people's money, entitlements
Date posted: October 18, 2014
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