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International Trade and Internet Freedom

Anupam Chander

University of California, Davis - School of Law

January 14, 2010

America Society of International Law, Vol. 102, p. 37, 2009
UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 201

Can trade liberalization serve the cause of political liberalization in authoritarian states? In this short essay, I suggest that trade law might bolster political freedoms by liberalizing Internet trade. Trade law puts pressure on state repression of information through two principal mechanisms.

First, GATS transparency obligations require what is often absent in authoritarian states – a set of public rules that governs both citizens and governmental authorities. WTO member states must publish regulations governing services and establish inquiry points where foreign service providers can obtain information about such regulations. A publication requirement written for the benefit of foreigners may prove even more useful for local citizens, who will be given the opportunity to understand the rules that bind them – and the opportunity therefore to challenge those rules or their interpretation.

Second, the market access and national treatment commitments provide opportunities for foreign information service providers to disseminate information that local information service providers might eschew. While censorship by itself may not necessarily constitute either a market access or a national treatment violation, it might do so if it is operationalized in ways that effectively discriminate against foreign service providers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Keywords: International trade, Internet, freedom, censorship, General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS

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Date posted: January 18, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Chander, Anupam, International Trade and Internet Freedom (January 14, 2010). America Society of International Law, Vol. 102, p. 37, 2009 ; UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 201. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536873

Contact Information

Anupam Chander (Contact Author)
University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )
400 Mrak Hall Drive
Davis, CA 95616-5201
United States
530-754-5304 (Phone)
530-754-5311 (Fax)

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