Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate
Stanford University Law School
January 18, 2010
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 71
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 392
Recent empirical data indicate that the Commission’s proxy access proposals reduce shareholder wealth and are inimical to the best interests of the shareholder community at large. Cross-sectional variation in stock price response data further suggest that the Commission should reject a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and that an opt-in rule is less likely to destroy shareholder wealth than an opt-out rule. None of the studies cited by the Commission in its request for further comment support a competing conclusion. The studies cited by the Commission instead suggest a rational basis for the market’s concern that the proxy access process can be captured by a small number of institutions with idiosyncratic objectives that conflict with the best interests of the larger shareholder community.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, corporate governance, directors, boards, shareholder rights, shareholder voting, event study, stock price
JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, G3, G38, K22, K23working papers series
Date posted: January 18, 2010
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