The Institutional Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report

Ghent Univ. Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2010-01

22 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2010

See all articles by Eddy Wymeersch

Eddy Wymeersch

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; ECGI

Date Written: January 25, 2010

Abstract

This interim report attempts to give a short overview of the most important workstreams in the field of securities regulation within the EU. It further gives a provisional analysis of the future supervisory structure after the adoption by the Council of ministers of the regulation on the future European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and on the European Systemic Risk board (ESRB) which are now being discussed in Parliament. The existing directives are all open for review, the Market Abuse, prospectus and Mifid directives being the first in line. These include works streams like the organisation of the derivative markets, the application of Mifid to dark pools and OTC equity trading. In the field of Credit rating agencies’ supervision, ESMA will be directly in charge. The proposed directive on Alternative Investment Managers is being discussed, while CESR is working on short selling, packaged retail investment products, money market funds definitions, and the like.

Keywords: Securities regulation, supervisory architecture, ESMA, ESRB, ESFS

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Wymeersch, Eddy O., The Institutional Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report (January 25, 2010). Ghent Univ. Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2010-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1541968 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1541968

Eddy O. Wymeersch (Contact Author)

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute ( email )

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Gent, B-9000
Belgium
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+32 9 264 68 55 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ugent.be/fli

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