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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542043
 
 

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Populist Retribution and International Competition in Financial Services Regulation


Adam C. Pritchard


University of Michigan Law School

January 25, 2010

Creighton Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2010): 335-55
U of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 10-004

Abstract:     
This essay compares the current effort to reform financial services regulation with the regulatory initiatives that come out of the Great Depression. Unlike the 1930s, policymakers today must account for the impact of regulatory competition in crafting responses to the financial crisis. The available evidence suggests that jurisdictional competition is no match for the forces of populist retribution in modern democratic states.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Regulatory competition

JEL Classification: D72, G28

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Date posted: January 25, 2010 ; Last revised: July 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Pritchard, Adam C., Populist Retribution and International Competition in Financial Services Regulation (January 25, 2010). Creighton Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2010): 335-55; U of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 10-004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542043

Contact Information

Adam C. Pritchard (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4048 (Phone)
734-647-7349 (Fax)

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