Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542829
 
 

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How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn't)


Chris Brummer


Georgetown University Law Center; The Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL); Milken Institute Center for Financial Markets; Atlantic Council

January 26, 2010

Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, 2011
Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-15
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 11-112

Abstract:     
The "Great Recession" has given way to a dizzying array of international agreements aimed at strengthening the prudential oversight and supervision of market participants. How these international financial rules operate is, however, deeply misunderstood. Theorists of international law view international financial rules as merely coordinating mechanisms in light of their informal "soft law" quality. Yet these scholars ignore the often steep distributional implications of financial rules that may favor some countries over others and thus fail to explain why soft law would be employed where losers to agreements can strategically defect from their commitments. Meanwhile, political scientists, though aware of the distributional dynamics of financial rule-making, rarely, if ever, examine international law as a category distinct from international politics. Law is instead cast as an inert, dependent variable of power, as opposed to an independent factor that can inform the behavior of regulators and market participants.

This Article presents an alternative theory for understanding the purpose, operation and limitations of international financial law. It posits that international financial regulation, though formally "soft," is a unique species of cross-border cooperation bolstered by reputational, market and institutional mechanisms that have been largely overlooked by theorists. As a result, it is more coercive than classical theories of international law predict. The Article notes, however, that these disciplinary mechanisms are hampered by a range of structural flaws that erode the "compliance pull" of global financial standards. In response to these shortcomings, the Article proposes a modest blueprint for regulatory reform that eschews more drastic (and impractical) calls for a global financial regulator and instead aims to leverage transparency in ways that more effectively force national authorities to internalize the costs of their regulatory decision-making.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 72

Keywords: Soft Law, International Finance, G-20, Financial Stability Board, Basel, IMF, World Bank, IOSCO

JEL Classification: K00, K33


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Date posted: January 27, 2010 ; Last revised: March 13, 2016

Suggested Citation

Brummer, Chris, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn't) (January 26, 2010). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 99, 2011; Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-15; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 11-112. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542829

Contact Information

Christopher J. Brummer (Contact Author)
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/brummer-chris.cfm
The Institute of International Economic Law (IIEL) ( email )
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
HOME PAGE: http://iielaw.org/member/chris-brummer-2/
Milken Institute Center for Financial Markets ( email )
1250 Fourth Street
Santa Monica, CA 90401
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.milkeninstitute.org/about/our-team/view/70
Atlantic Council ( email )
1101 15th Street, NW
11th Floor
DC 20005
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/chris-brummer
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