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'Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review'


Jed Handelsman Shugerman


Harvard University - Harvard Law School

January 26, 2010

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 4, 2010

Abstract:     
Almost ninety percent of state judges today face some kind of popular election. This peculiar institution emerged in a sudden burst from 1846 to 1853, when twenty states adopted judicial elections. The modern perception is that judicial elections, then and now, weaken judges and the rule of law. Indeed, some critics of judicial power in the early republic supported judicial elections for precisely those reasons, but instead, they focused on other more direct attacks on the courts.

Judicial elections swept the country in the late 1840s and 1850s and the key was a new movement to limit legislative power, to increase judicial power, and to strengthen judicial review. Over time, judicial appointments had become more a tool of party patronage and cronyism. Legislative overspending on internal improvements and an economic depression in the early 1840s together had plunged the states into crippling debt. A wave of nineteen states called constitutional conventions from 1844 to 1853, and in addition to direct limits on legislative power, these conventions adopted judicial elections. Many delegates stated that their purpose was to strengthen the separation of powers and to empower courts to use judicial review.

The reformers got results: elected judges in the 1850s struck down many more state laws than their appointed predecessors had in any other decade. These elected judges played a role in the shift from active state involvement in economic growth to laissez-faire constitutionalism. Oddly, the first generation of elected judges were the first to justify judicial review in countermajoritarian terms, in the defense of individual and minority rights against abusive majorities and the “evils” of democracy. This Article concludes with lessons about judicial independence and democracy from this story.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

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Date posted: January 27, 2010 ; Last revised: February 17, 2010

Suggested Citation

Shugerman, Jed Handelsman, 'Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review' (January 26, 2010). Harvard Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 4, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542870

Contact Information

Jed Handelsman Shugerman (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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