Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games

Robles, Jack

Abstract

Citations

Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games

Jack Robles

Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

2001

Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 34, pp. 312-330, 2001

Abstract:
I apply a version of Kandori et al. (1993, Econometrica, 61, 29–56) and Young's (1993, Econometrica, 61, 57–84) evolutionary dynamic to finitely repeated coordination games. The dynamic is modified by allowing mutations to affect only off path beliefs. I find that repetition within a match leads agents to sacrifice current payoffs in order to increase payoffs in later stages. As a consequence, evolution leads to (almost) efficiency.

Keywords: Evolution, Finite repetition, Coordination Games, Path beliefs, Repetition, Efficiency

JEL Classification: C79

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: January 27, 2010

Suggested Citation

Robles, Jack, Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games (2001). Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 34, pp. 312-330, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542917

Contact Information

Jack Robles (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington 6001
New Zealand