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Banks as Coordinators of Economic Growth and Stability: Microfoundation for Macroeconomy with Externality


Kenichi Ueda


International Monetary Fund (IMF)

May 2, 2012

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954), I formulate a standard growth model with externality — a two-period version of Romer (1986) — as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or intermediaries, I show that no Nash equilibrium exists. With several banks strategically intermediating capital, a Nash equilibrium emerges with a realistic institution, i.e., an interbank market with a negotiation process in the loan market.The equilibrium outcome is uniquely determined and socially optimal.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: bank competition, bank control, growth, instability, discontinuous game

JEL Classification: C72, D51, G21, O16, O41

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Date posted: January 27, 2010 ; Last revised: May 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Ueda, Kenichi, Banks as Coordinators of Economic Growth and Stability: Microfoundation for Macroeconomy with Externality (May 2, 2012). Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1542930

Contact Information

Kenichi Ueda (Contact Author)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
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