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How to Regulate a Financial Market? The Impact of the 1893-1898 Regulatory Reforms on the Paris Bourse


Pierre Cyrille Hautcoeur


Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Amir Rezaee


EDHEC Business School; University of Orleans - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orléans

Angelo Riva


affiliation not provided to SSRN

January 27, 2010


Abstract:     
Theoretical and historical experience suggests a financial centre may either include a single, consolidated and loosely regulated stock exchange attracting all intermediaries and actors, or a variety of exchanges going from strictly regulated to completely unregulated and adapted to the needs of different categories of intermediaries, investors and issuers. Choosing between these two solutions is uneasy because few substantial changes occur at this “meta-regulatory” level. The history of the Paris exchanges provides a good example, since two changes in opposite directions occurred in the late 19th century, when Paris was the second financial centre in the world. In 1893, a law threatened the existing two-exchanges equilibrium by diminishing the advantages of the more regulated exchange; in 1898, another law brought them back. We analyse the impact of these two changes on the competition between the exchanges in terms of securities listed, traded volumes and spreads. We conclude competition among exchanges is a delicate matter and efficiency is not always where one would think.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Paris, Stock Exchange, Microstructures, Reforms, Regulation, Monopoly, Spreads

JEL Classification: G14, G18, G24, N13, N23, N43

working papers series


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Date posted: January 28, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hautcoeur, Pierre Cyrille, Rezaee, Amir and Riva, Angelo, How to Regulate a Financial Market? The Impact of the 1893-1898 Regulatory Reforms on the Paris Bourse (January 27, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543291 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543291

Contact Information

Pierre Cyrille Hautcoeur (Contact Author)
Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )
48 bd JOURDAN
Paris, 75014 75014
France
Amir Rezaee
EDHEC Business School ( email )
France
University of Orleans - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orléans ( email )
Rue de Blois BP6739
Rue de Blois
Orléans cedex 2, 45067
France
Angelo Riva
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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