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Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional Investors and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions


Miguel A. Ferreira


Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Massimo Massa


INSEAD - Finance

Pedro P. Matos


University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

September 2009

The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 2, pp. 601-644, 2009

Abstract:     
We study the role of institutional investors in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with the intensity of cross-border M&A activity worldwide. Foreign institutional ownership increases the probability that a merger deal is cross-border, successful, and the bidder takes full control of the target firm. This relation is stronger in countries with weaker legal institutions and in less developed markets, suggesting some substitutability between local governance and foreign institutional investors. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that foreign institutional investors act as facilitators in the international market for corporate control; they build bridges between firms and reduce transaction costs and information asymmetry between bidder and target. We conclude that cross-border portfolio investments of institutional money managers and cross-border M&As are complements in promoting financial integration worldwide.

Keywords: G15, G23, G34

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 1, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Miguel A., Massa, Massimo and Matos, Pedro P., Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional Investors and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (September 2009). The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 2, pp. 601-644, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544183 or http://dx.doi.org/hhp070

Contact Information

Miguel Almeida Ferreira
Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Massimo Massa
INSEAD - Finance ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4481 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4045 (Fax)
Pedro P. Matos
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )
University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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