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The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits


Daniel Shaviro


New York University School of Law

March 2010

NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-12
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-09

Abstract:     
In international tax policy debate, it is usually assumed that, if one chooses not to exempt residents’ foreign source income, the preferred system would offer foreign tax credits. This assumption is mistaken, given the bad incentives created by the credits’ marginal reimbursement rate (MRR) of 100 percent and the unpersuasiveness of common rationales for granting them, such as those based on aversion to “double taxation” or support for capital export neutrality. While taxing foreign source income at the full domestic rate with only deductions for foreign taxes would over-tax outbound investment, at least in principle creditability is dominated by a burden-neutral shift to deductions plus a reduced tax rate for such income. And even if such a shift is unfeasible or unwise, the incentive problems resulting from a 100 percent MRR for foreign taxes paid may illuminate various more practical tax issues, such as (1) the merits of shifting to an exemption system, which features implicit deductibility, and (2) the merits of various proposed reforms, such as removing disincentives in subpart F for foreign tax planning by U.S. multinationals.

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Date posted: February 4, 2010 ; Last revised: June 6, 2010

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits (March 2010). NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-12; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547312 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1547312

Contact Information

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
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