Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
University of Innsbruck - Department of Economics
IZA Discussion Paper No. 4732
We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Keywords: strategic sophistication, beliefs, experiment, team decision making, individual decision making
JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92working papers series
Date posted: February 8, 2010
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