Hedge Fund Activism and Information Disclosure: The Case of Germany
45 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2010 Last revised: 17 Dec 2015
Date Written: January 31, 2010
Abstract
Based on the German regulatory framework, we provide a more detailed picture about the information disclosure process surrounding the announcement of major shareholdings of hedge funds in listed companies. We separate price and volume effects between three event dates: the transaction date when the investor reaches a notifiable threshold, the announcement date when potential insiders (the target firm and the regulator) get advance information, and the publication date when the information is officially released to the public. The separation makes it possible to analyze information and price pressure effects in some detail. The paper also documents the extent and nature of delays in hedge funds’ notification behavior.
Keywords: Shareholder activism, Hedge funds, Corporate governance
JEL Classification: G14, G34, G23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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