Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553094
 
 

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Law and Economics of Shareholder Rights and Ownership Structures: How Trivial are Shareholder Rights for Shareholders?


Christoph Van der Elst


Tilburg Law School; Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Department of Business Law

February 15, 2010

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-009
Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 008/2010

Abstract:     
Law and Finance theory stresses the importance of shareholder rights for the reliability and development of capital markets. Many European Parliaments picked up this corporate governance issue. We expand the analysis of Lele and Siems (2007) and show that the number of shareholder rights grew steadily in many countries over the last fifteen years. In particular the protection of shareholders against shirking of the board members and the officers increased significantly. The protection of minority shareholders against the expropriation of major shareholders remained unchanged. In light of these findings, it can be expected that after a time lag ownership concentration would decrease in continental Europe. However, our evidence is mixed. The analysis of the development of shareholder structures from different perspectives - ownership concentration, shareholder classes and ownership distribution - revealed only limited support for the Law and Finance arguments. The results cause serious doubts on the influence of shareholder rights on ownership structures and the development of liquid capital markets. That is not to say, shareholder rights have no added value and should be abolished. The mixed evidence suggests that other variables, like the presence of activist shareholders, might be much more influential than the development of shareholder rights.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: ownership structure, law and finance, legal regulation, convergence

JEL Classification: G32, G34, K22

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Date posted: February 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Van der Elst, Christoph, Law and Economics of Shareholder Rights and Ownership Structures: How Trivial are Shareholder Rights for Shareholders? (February 15, 2010). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-009; Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 008/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553094

Contact Information

Christoph Van der Elst (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law School ( email )
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Department of Business Law ( email )
Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, B-9000
Belgium
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