Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and the Laboratory
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics
National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Institute of Economic Theory and Analysis (GATE); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
December 1, 2009
GATE Working Paper No. 09-31
There is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age, but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers. We investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in experiments conducted both onsite with the employees of two large firms and in a conventional laboratory environment with students and retirees. We show that seniors are no more risk averse than juniors and are typically more cooperative ; both juniors and working seniors respond strongly to competition. The implication is that it may be beneficial to define additional incentives near the end of the career to motivate and retain older workers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Age, performance, diversity, stereotypes, cooperation, competition, inter-generational games, experiments
JEL Classification: A13, B49, C91, C93, J14, J18, J38, J7working papers series
Date posted: February 17, 2010 ; Last revised: June 14, 2010
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