Why Investor Protection is Not All That Matters in Corporate Law and Economics

The Icfai University Journal of Corporate and Securities Law, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 8-28, May 2009

RILE Working Paper Series No. 2009/03

28 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2010

See all articles by Alessio M. Pacces

Alessio M. Pacces

Amsterdam Law School / Amsterdam Business School (ACLE); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); European Banking Institute

Abstract

The standard approach to the legal foundations of corporate governance is based on the 'law matters' thesis, according to which corporate law promotes separation of ownership and control by protecting minority shareholders from expropriation. This paper takes a broader perspective on the economic and legal determinants of corporate governance. It shows that investor protection is a necessary, but not sufficient, legal condition for efficient separation of ownership and control. Supporting control powers vested in managers or controlling shareholders is at least as important as protecting investors from their abuse. Corporate law does not only matter in the last respect; it matters in both. This result is derived by interpreting corporate governance based on three categories of private benefits of control. Corporate law affects corporate governance depending on its impact on each category of private benefits, and not just on those accounting for shareholder expropriation. Three major areas of corporate law are considered with this view. The first is the legal distribution of corporate powers. The second is the discipline of related-party transactions. The third is regulation of control transactions. The three areas are investigated comparatively in the US, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The investigation shows that, when corporate law is analyzed in this fashion, it explains the different patterns and performance of corporate governance. This account of corporate law is not only useful for understanding separation of ownership and control, but also for indicating how to improve its efficiency through legal intervention.

JEL Classification: G34, K22, K42, L26, O16

Suggested Citation

Pacces, Alessio Maria, Why Investor Protection is Not All That Matters in Corporate Law and Economics. The Icfai University Journal of Corporate and Securities Law, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 8-28, May 2009, RILE Working Paper Series No. 2009/03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1553744

Alessio Maria Pacces (Contact Author)

Amsterdam Law School / Amsterdam Business School (ACLE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.uva.nl/profiel/p/a/a.m.pacces/a.m.pacces.html

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://ecgi.global/users/alessio-pacces

European Banking Institute ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

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