Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter?
Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
February 19, 2010
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-09
Gordon Tullock’s critique of the common law runs against much of the conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature. In this paper we revisit one of the most controversial aspects of Tullock’s critique. By applying Tullock’s own model of rent-seeking to litigation, we study the effect of alternative procedural rules on civil litigation. Our results provide support for Tullock’s controversial critique of the common law, revealing an evolutionary bias in the production of legal rules by courts. We extend the standard litigation model to study the effects of alternative procedural systems on the evolution of the common law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34
Keywords: Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis, Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking, English Rule, American Rule
JEL Classification: B31, D72, K10, K12, K13, K41working papers series
Date posted: February 19, 2010
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