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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557172
 
 

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Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive


Saikrishna Prakash


University of Virginia School of Law

2009

Willamette Law Review, Vol. 45, pp. 101-123, 2009
Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper

Abstract:     
With their focus on the originalist bona fides of the unitary executive and the modern administrative state’s numerous violations of the theory, unitary executivists have neglected the Constitution’s various constraints on the President’s ability to control law execution and the extent to which Congress can make the task of presidential control difficult, if not impossible. This short piece aims to fill that void. Part I outlines the fragmented features of the Constitution’s unitary executive. Part II describes how the President’s control of the executive branch is somewhat dependent upon Congress. In particular, it discusses how Congress might thwart and tame the attempts by the Executive Office of the President to control agency decision making. Part III addresses the extent to which recent regulatory review procedures are consistent with constitutional constraints on the unitary executive and concludes that, even from the perspective of the theory of the unitary executive, these procedures are too “unitary.”

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Offices, Officers, President, Congress, Unitary Executive, Regulatory Review, White House Staff, Presidential Power, Executive Power, Appointments, Appropriations, Removal, 12866, Bush, Clinton, Regulatory Policy Officers

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Date posted: February 22, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Prakash, Saikrishna, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive (2009). Willamette Law Review, Vol. 45, pp. 101-123, 2009; Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557172

Contact Information

Saikrishna Prakash (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
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