Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559238
 


 



Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages


Alex B. Long


University of Tennessee College of Law

February 25, 2010

44 UC Davis Law Review 413 (2010)
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 103

Abstract:     
Unbeknownst to many lawyers, numerous jurisdictions - including New York and California - have statutes on the books that single out lawyers who engage in deceit or collusion. In nearly all of these jurisdictions, a lawyer found to have engaged in deceit or collusion faces criminal penalties and/or civil liability in the form of treble damages. Until recently, these attorney deceit statutes have languished in obscurity and, through a series of restrictive readings of the statutory language, have been rendered somewhat irrelevant. However, in 2009, the New York Court of Appeals breathed new life into New York’s attorney deceit statute through its decision in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg. This Article discusses the extent to which, in this age of widespread distrust of the legal profession, this type of external regulation of the legal profession is a desirable approach. The Article concludes that although the utility of existing attorney deceit statues is undermined by the broadness of the language, the symbolism of the statutes is important. By relying on the development of tort law to address the same subject matter, courts can achieve the same educational and symbolic goals while dealing with attorney deceit on a more practical basis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 70

Keywords: Deceit, Ethics, Professional Responsibility, Torts

JEL Classification: K13, K30, K40, K42

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Date posted: February 27, 2010 ; Last revised: July 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Long, Alex B., Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages (February 25, 2010). 44 UC Davis Law Review 413 (2010); University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 103. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559238 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1559238

Contact Information

Alex B. Long (Contact Author)
University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )
1505 West Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
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