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Family Values and the Regulation of Labor


Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Yann Algan


Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Pierre Cahuc


National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Paola Giuliano


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

February 2010

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7688

Abstract:     
Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Family values, Labor Markets Regulation

JEL Classification: E0, P16, Z10, Z13

working papers series


Date posted: March 1, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F., Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre and Giuliano, Paola, Family Values and the Regulation of Labor (February 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7688. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559644

Contact Information

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Yann Algan
Universite Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne - CNRS-EUREQUA ( email )
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Pierre Cahuc
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )
92245 Malakoff Cedex
France
University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/
French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Paola Giuliano
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )
110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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