Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559871
 
 

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Contracting Over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property and Academic Publication


Joshua S. Gans


University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Fiona Murray


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center

Scott Stern


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 16, 2014


Abstract:     
This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the tension over knowledge disclosure between firms and their scientific employees. While empirical research suggests that scientists exhibit a “taste for science,” such open disclosures can limit a firm’s competitive advantage or ability to profitably commercialize their innovations. To explore how this tension is resolved we focus on the strategic interaction between researchers and firms bargaining over whether (and how) knowledge will be disclosed. We evaluate four disclosure strategies: secrecy, patenting, open science (scientific publication) and patent-paper pairs providing insights into the determinants of the disclosure strategy of a firm. We find that patents and publications can be complementary instruments facilitating the disclosure of knowledge-providing predictions as to when stronger IP protection regimes might drive openness by firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: disclosure, science, academic freedom, publication, secrecy, cumulative knowledge, intellectual property protection

JEL Classification: O34

working papers series


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Date posted: February 27, 2010 ; Last revised: September 17, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gans, Joshua S. and Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott, Contracting Over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property and Academic Publication (September 16, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1559871

Contact Information

Joshua S. Gans (Contact Author)
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuagans.com

NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Fiona E. Murray
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center ( email )
United States
Scott Stern
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-3053 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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