The Ethics of 'Commercial Bribery': Integrative Social Contract Theory Meets Transaction Cost Economics
D. Bruce Johnsen
George Mason University - School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
February 26, 2010
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 88, No. 4, October 2009
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-13
This paper provides a modified Integrative Social Contract Theory (ISCT) analysis of commercial bribery based on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commercial bribery in the Honda case (1996) may well have benefited Honda’s dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose that the term 'commercial bribery' should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term 'third-party payments' is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis.
Keywords: aggregate welfare, business ethics, community norms, dealer promotion, Donaldson, fairness, federalism, Hardin, informational role of prices, justice, Ronald Coase, social efficiency, stakeholders, Tom Dunfee
JEL Classification: A13, J41, K12, L14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 1, 2010
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.235 seconds