Managed Trade with Imperfect Information
Rutgers University; University of California, Berkeley
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of IE&M
International Economic Review, Vol. 51, Issue 1, pp. 187-211, February 2010
This article illustrates the importance of imperfect information in self-enforcing trade agreements. It shows that expected welfare is higher with current period uncertainty, and a high level of uncertainty may even undermine the need for a safeguard clause. These results were derived by extending the seminal paper by Bagwell and Staiger (The American Economic Review 80 (1990), 779–95) to account for current period uncertainty.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 1, 2010
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