Abstract

 


 



A European View on the Legitimacy of Accounting Procedures: Towards a Deliberative-Accountability Framework for Analysis


Ulf M.T. Luthardt


Tilburg University

Jochen Zimmermann


University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control

February 28, 2010

Research in Accounting Regulations, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2009

Abstract:     
Accounting rules affect fundamental areas of social interaction encompassing groups that have diverse and conflicting interests regarding financial reporting. In the absence of a coherent social choice theory, concepts of legitimacy can be used to assess the acceptance of accounting standard-setting processes and their resulting norms. In this paper, we analyze the standard-setting process in Europe. Accounting rules in Europe are developed in a two-stage process involving both private standard-setting and public rule-making. From a structural perspective, the European Union (EU) is well positioned to develop legitimate accounting procedures. However, the original purpose and the ensuing legitimacy of its control mechanism are jeopardized when EU structures are used and sometimes abused for policy formation and the creation of EU-IFRS.

Keywords: accounting regulation, social choice theory, European Union, IFRS

JEL Classification: M41

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 28, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Luthardt, Ulf M.T. and Zimmermann, Jochen, A European View on the Legitimacy of Accounting Procedures: Towards a Deliberative-Accountability Framework for Analysis (February 28, 2010). Research in Accounting Regulations, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561244

Contact Information

Ulf Michael Thomas Luthardt (Contact Author)
Tilburg University ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Jochen Zimmermann
University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )
Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)
University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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