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File name: SSRN-id2191642. ; Size: 199K
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Did SOX Section 404 Make Firms Less Opaque? Evidence from Cross-Listed Firms
Stefan Arping
University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Business School; Tinbergen Institute
Zacharias Sautner
University of Amsterdam - University of Amsterdam Business School; Duisenberg School of Finance; Tinbergen Institute
August 01, 2012
Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming
Abstract:
We study whether Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made cross-listed firms less opaque via an examination of analyst earnings forecasts. To test this, we compare European Union (EU) firms that are cross-listed in the US — and therefore subject to S404 — with comparable EU firms that are not cross listed. We find that while both types of firms experienced a decrease in opaqueness over time, this decrease was significantly larger for cross-listed firms. Our results are robust to accounting for concurrent sell-side analyst regulations in the US, delistings, and changes in corporate risk taking. Overall, our analysis suggests that SOX had a positive effect on corporate disclosure quality.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Analyst Forecasts, Corporate Governance, Disclosure Regulation
JEL Classification: G1, G3
working papers series
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Date posted: March 2, 2010
; Last revised: December 19, 2012
Suggested CitationArping, Stefan and Sautner, Zacharias, Did SOX Section 404 Make Firms Less Opaque? Evidence from Cross-Listed Firms (August 01, 2012). Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1561619
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