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Cournot Equilibrium in a Model of Hardware and Software Manufacturers' Interaction


Vladimir I. Soloviev


Institute for Humanities and Information Technology

Natalia A. Iliina


State University of Management

Marina V. Samoyavcheva


State University of Management, Moscow, Russia

2009

Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Oeconomica, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 4, 2009

Abstract:     
A model of interaction between hardware vendors, Intel and AMD, and developers of Windows and Linux operating systems is suggested. Intel and AMD both maximize profits forming a traditional oligopoly, while Microsoft and the community of Linux developers form a mixed duopoly, in which only the first party maximizes its profit. We consider a Cournot situation, when each of the profit-maximizing suppliers sets the price based on available market information on other players’ products prices in the previous time moment, and assuming the cross-price elasticities to zero. At the Cournot equilibrium, an Intel-based PC running Windows is 5 times more expensive than AMD-based PC running Linux; an Intel CPU costs 2 times more than AMD processor; Windows license is 1,5 times more expensive than Intel processor; and the profit of Intel is 4 times greater than the profit of AMD, while Microsoft has just 12,5% greater profit than Intel.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Complementors, Complements, Cournot Equilibrium, Pricing

JEL Classification: C72, D43, K21, L13, L15, M21

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Date posted: March 3, 2010 ; Last revised: March 1, 2011

Suggested Citation

Soloviev, Vladimir I., Iliina, Natalia A. and Samoyavcheva, Marina V., Cournot Equilibrium in a Model of Hardware and Software Manufacturers' Interaction (2009). Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Oeconomica, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 4, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562725

Contact Information

Vladimir I. Soloviev (Contact Author)
Institute for Humanities and Information Technology ( email )
53 Verkhnyaya Pervomayskaya
Moscow, 105264
Russia
HOME PAGE: http://visoloviev.ru
Natalia A. Iliina
State University of Management ( email )
99, Ruzyanski Prospect
Moscow, 123060
Russia
HOME PAGE: http://www.guu.ru
Marina V. Samoyavcheva
State University of Management, Moscow, Russia ( email )
99, Ruzyanski Prospect
Moscow, 123060
Russia
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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