Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562727
 
 

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FTC v. Intel: Applying the 'Consumer Choice' Framework to 'Pure' Section 5 Allegations


Robert H. Lande


University of Baltimore - School of Law

February 1, 2010

The CPI Antitrust Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 1-7, February 2010

Abstract:     
This short article analyzes the "pure" Section 5 allegations in the recent FTC complaint against Intel. It first shows that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is more encompassing than the Sherman Act and why this breath is in the public interest. It next analyzes allegations from the Intel Complaint, showing why each appears to be in the public interest yet might not be permitted by the Sherman Act. It also discusses other advantages that would arise if these charges were litigated under Section 5 rather than the Sherman Act.

The article notes assertions by Intel and others that any interpretation of Section 5 that goes beyond the Sherman Act is unduly or even unconstitutionally unpredictable and without principles. As a reaction, in its final section the article briefly explains the "consumer choice" approach to antitrust. The article concludes by demonstrating that if the Commission employs the consumer choice framework, any violation of Section 5 will be both in the public interest and not unduly standardless, regardless whether that conduct also would violate the Sherman Act.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Intel, Section 5, FTC Act, incipiency, Sherman Act, Federal Trade Commission, consumer choice, choice

JEL Classification: K21, L63, K39, K49

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Date posted: March 4, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H., FTC v. Intel: Applying the 'Consumer Choice' Framework to 'Pure' Section 5 Allegations (February 1, 2010). The CPI Antitrust Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 1-7, February 2010 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562727 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1562727

Contact Information

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
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