References (41)



Pension Design in the Presence of Systemic Risk

Stavros Panageas

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

December 30, 2010

I consider the possibility that individual agents’ savings and portfolio choices can have negative externalities on public finances, whenever retirement consumption drops below a minimum level. Within this framework, I discuss optimal pension design. I show the optimality of two policies. The first policy mandates that agents use part of their accumulated assets to purchase a claim providing a fixed income stream for the duration of their life. The second policy mandates the purchase of an appropriately structured portfolio insurance policy. Both policies are financed by an appropriate mandatory minimum savings requirement, while the agent is still a worker.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Continuous Time Optimization, Life Cycle Savings And Portfolio Choice, Ricardian Equivalence, Borrowing Constraints, Optimal Contracts

JEL Classification: C6, D6, D9, E2, E6, G1

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: March 4, 2010 ; Last revised: December 30, 2010

Suggested Citation

Panageas, Stavros, Pension Design in the Presence of Systemic Risk (December 30, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1562793

Contact Information

Stavros Panageas (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 701
Downloads: 97
Download Rank: 190,198
References:  41

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.219 seconds