Abstract

 
 

Footnotes (34)



 


 



Equity on Demand: The Netflix Approach to Compensation


David F. Larcker


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Brian Tayan


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Allan L. McCall


Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

2010

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Teaching Case No. CG -19

Abstract:     
Netflix was among a small group of Silicon Valley companies to emerge from the technology bubble of the late 1990s a clear winner in terms of growth, market share, and profitability. That Netflix was able not only to prevail over this competition but also to thrive was largely attributable to the culture of freedom and responsibility inculcated by founder Reed Hastings. To foster this culture, the company adopted a series of unique employment practices that were meant to attract, retain, and motivate the type of employee that Netflix valued. Among these practices was a compensation system with several unconventional features. Whereas most companies provided compensation packages with a predetermined mix of cash and equity-based awards, Netflix turned the model on its head and allowed employees to request their own mix. Management was interested in finding out whether this practice supported or detracted from the company’s main objectives for its employees.

Keywords: compensation, Corporate Culture, Corporate Governance, Human Resources Management, employee stock ownership

JEL Classification: G3, G30

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: March 5, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F., Tayan, Brian and McCall, Allan L., Equity on Demand: The Netflix Approach to Compensation (2010). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Teaching Case No. CG -19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564239

Contact Information

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Brian Tayan
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Allan L. McCall
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 879
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.343 seconds