Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566352
 
 

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Killing Us Sweetly: How to Take Industry Out of the FDA


Jason Iuliano


Harvard University - Law School - Alumni; Princeton University - Department of Politics

March 7, 2010

Journal of Food Law and Policy, Vol. 6, p. 31, 2010

Abstract:     
For more than a century, the Food and Drug Administration has claimed to protect the public health. During that time, it has actually been placing corporate profits above consumer safety. Nowhere is this corruption more evident than in the approval of artificial sweeteners. FDA leaders’ close ties to the very industry they were supposed to be regulating present a startling picture. Ignoring warnings from both independent scientists and their own review panels, FDA decision makers let greed guide their actions. They approved carcinogenic sweeteners such as saccharin, aspartame, and sucralose while simultaneously banning the natural herb stevia because it would cut into industry profits. This Article proposes two reforms that can end these corrupt practices and take industry out of the FDA. By strengthening conflict of interest regulations and preventing companies from participating in safety trials, the FDA will be able to gain the independence it needs in order to regulate the food and drug industries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: Artificial Sweeteners, Aspartame, Saccharin, Sucralose, Health Law, Food And Drug Law, Health, FDA, Conflict of Interest, Corruption, Corrupt, Agency, Agency Capture, Revolving Door, Consumer Protection

JEL Classification: H51, I18, I10

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Date posted: March 7, 2010 ; Last revised: August 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Iuliano, Jason, Killing Us Sweetly: How to Take Industry Out of the FDA (March 7, 2010). Journal of Food Law and Policy, Vol. 6, p. 31, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566352

Contact Information

Jason Iuliano (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Law School - Alumni ( email )
5163 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Princeton University - Department of Politics ( email )
Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
United States
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