Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566985
 
 

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The Riddle Underlying Refusal-to-Deal Theory


Alan J. Devlin


Latham & Watkins

Michael S. Jacobs


DePaul University - College of Law

March 8, 2010

Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Vol. 105, p. 1, 2010

Abstract:     
May a dominant firm refuse to share its intellectual property with its rivals? This question lies at the heart of a highly divisive, international debate concerning the proper application of the antitrust laws. In this short essay, we consider a profound, yet previously unaddressed, incongruity underlying the controversy. Specifically, why is it that monopolists refuse to share their IP, even at monopoly prices? In exploring this question, we unearth an inescapable contradiction that afflicts the arguments of those who would require monopolists to license their IP in certain circumstances.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 4

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Date posted: March 8, 2010 ; Last revised: June 25, 2010

Suggested Citation

Devlin, Alan J. and Jacobs, Michael S., The Riddle Underlying Refusal-to-Deal Theory (March 8, 2010). Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Vol. 105, p. 1, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566985

Contact Information

Alan James Devlin (Contact Author)
Latham & Watkins ( email )
United States
Michael S. Jacobs
DePaul University - College of Law ( email )
25 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL Cook County 60604-2287
United States
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