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Corporate Governance and the Information Environment: Evidence from State Antitakeover Laws


Chris Armstrong


University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Karthik Balakrishnan


University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Daniel A. Cohen


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

June 17, 2011

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming.

Abstract:     
We examine the relation between corporate governance and firms’ information environments. We use the passage of state antitakeover laws in the U.S. as a source of exogenous variation in an important governance mechanism to identify changes in firms’ information environments. We find that information asymmetry and private information gathering decreased and that financial statement informativeness increased following the passage of the antitakeover laws. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that the increased level of financial statement informativeness is attributable to firms that are most likely to access equity markets rather than managerial entrenchment, managerial career concerns, or managers’ pursuit of the quiet life.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: antitakeover laws, corporate governance, financial reporting quality, information asymmetry

JEL Classification: M41, G10

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: March 10, 2010 ; Last revised: November 15, 2011

Suggested Citation

Armstrong, Chris S., Balakrishnan, Karthik and Cohen, Daniel A., Corporate Governance and the Information Environment: Evidence from State Antitakeover Laws (June 17, 2011). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567291

Contact Information

Chris S. Armstrong
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Karthik Balakrishnan
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3620 Locust Walk
1800 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
Philadelphia, PA Pennsylvania 19104
United States
Daniel A. Cohen (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
972-883-4772 (Phone)
972-883-6811 (Fax)
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