Competition Policy and Financial Distress
Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
March 9, 2010
Northwestern Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-08
Traditional analyses of competition policy assume that firms operate in perfect credit markets. We argue that imperfections in credit markets should be taken into account, and show one channel by which accounting for financial conditions could alter the welfare effects of a merger. In line with empirical evidence, we posit that the presence of financial distress might diminish price competition by reducing firms' willingness to undertake long-term investments in their customer base. Mergers that reduce the probability of financial distress can induce the merging firms to compete more fiercely for customers, thus partly offsetting the traditional effects of an increase in market power. We use this framework to derive implications for competition policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Financial Distress, Competition Policy,Merger Analysis, Switching Costs
JEL Classification: K20, L40
Date posted: March 11, 2010
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