Contractual Versus Actual Severance Pay Following CEO Departure

Abstract:     
Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contract and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their company. We analyze what are the determinants of whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. This excess separation pay is on average, $8 million, which amounts to close to 242% of a CEOs’ annual compensation. We investigate several potential explanations for this phenomenon and find evidence that in voluntary CEO departures, excess separation pay represents a governance problem. In contrast, we find evidence that in forced departures, excess separation pay represents a need to facilitate a quick and smooth transition from the failed ex-CEO to a new CEO. These results help to shed light on the dual role played by severance compensation and on the bargaining game played between the board and the departing executive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Executive compensation, Severance, Separation pay, CEO turnover

JEL Classification: G34, J33, J41

working papers series