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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569493
 
 

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Predation Under Perfect Information


Cédric Argenton


Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

March 12, 2010

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-013

Abstract:     
In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of three identical firms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the prey) decides to exit immediately, after which the predators can enjoy higher profits, even if they do not raise their price. Predatory prices are thus observed on the equilibrium path and the predators end up earning more than in the best Bertrand (or even, collusive) equilibrium with three firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: predation, predatory pricing, collusion, dynamic game, Bertrand competition

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L41

working papers series


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Date posted: March 17, 2010 ; Last revised: April 7, 2010

Suggested Citation

Argenton, Cédric, Predation Under Perfect Information (March 12, 2010). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569493 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569493

Contact Information

Cédric Argenton (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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