Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569531
 
 

References (53)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited


Christian Andres


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Inga Van den Bongard


University of Mannheim - Finance Area

Mirco Lehmann


University of Bonn

September 30, 2013

Forthcoming Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

Abstract:     
We investigate the relationship between firm governance and the board’s position in the social network of directors. Using a sample of 133 German firms over the four-year period from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms with intensely connected supervisory boards (1) are associated with lower firm performance, and (2) pay their executives significantly more. We interpret these results as evidence of poor monitoring in firms with directors who are more embedded in the social network. In both cases, simple measures for busy directors that were used by other studies in the past fail to show any significant pattern. The findings suggest that the quality and structural position of additional board seats may play a bigger role than simply the number of board appointments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: Director Network, Busy Board, Agency Theory, Executive Compensation

JEL Classification: G30, G38

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 14, 2010 ; Last revised: September 30, 2013

Suggested Citation

Andres, Christian and van den Bongard, Inga and Lehmann, Mirco, Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited (September 30, 2013). Forthcoming Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569531

Contact Information

Christian Andres (Contact Author)
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Inga Van den Bongard
University of Mannheim - Finance Area ( email )
Mannheim, 68131
Germany
Mirco Lehmann
University of Bonn ( email )
Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,465
Downloads: 290
Download Rank: 61,617
References:  53
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.360 seconds