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Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks' Borrowing Costs?

Connan Andrew Snider

UCLA - Department of Economics

Thomas Youle

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics

April 2, 2010

The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a vital benchmark interest rate to which hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial contracts are tied. Recently observers have raised concerns that the Libor may not accurately reflect average bank borrowing costs, it's ostensible target. In this paper we provide two types of evidence that this is the case. We first show that bank quotes in the Libor survey are difficult to rationalize by observable cost measures, including a given bank's quotes in other currency panels. Our second type of evidence is based on a simple model of bank quote choices in the Libor survey. The model predicts that if banks have incentives to affect the rate (as opposed to simply reporting costs), we should see bunching of quotes around particular points and no such bunching in the absence of these incentives. We show that there is strong evidence of the predicted bunching behavior in the data. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that several banks have large portfolio exposures to the Libor and have recently profited from the rapid descent of the Libor. We conjecture that these exposures may be the source of misreporting incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

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Date posted: March 19, 2010 ; Last revised: April 6, 2010

Suggested Citation

Snider, Connan Andrew and Youle, Thomas, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks' Borrowing Costs? (April 2, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569603

Contact Information

Connan Andrew Snider
UCLA - Department of Economics ( email )
Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States
Thomas Youle (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )
271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-625-7837 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~youle001/
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