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Inside the Coasean Firm: Competence as a Random Variable


Richard A. Epstein


New York University School of Law; Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; University of Chicago - Law School

March 12, 2010

University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 515

Abstract:     
The work of Ronald Coase is notable for two primary reasons. First, it introduced the notion of transaction costs to explain the formation and maintenance of firms, Second, it advanced our understanding of the critical topic of social costs. Yet, while transaction costs are key to understanding why firms are organized, they do not offer a complete explanation of how they are organized. A richer account of the problem properly stresses that differences in individual levels of competence, as well as individual variations in temperament and taste, explain why, for example, some firms are organized as partnerships and others as straight employment arrangements, with many permutations in between. Understanding differential levels of competence also helps to explain issues in areas from employment discrimination law to capital markets and tort liability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

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Date posted: March 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Richard A., Inside the Coasean Firm: Competence as a Random Variable (March 12, 2010). University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 515. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569759 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569759

Contact Information

Richard A. Epstein (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
United States
(212) 992-8858 (Phone)
(212) 995-4894 (Fax)
Stanford University - Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9563 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
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