Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571046
 
 

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Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors


Joseph A. McCahery


Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Zacharias Sautner


Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH

Laura T. Starks


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

July 06, 2015

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories we document widespread behind-the-scenes intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. Both governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, in which intervention typically will occur prior to a potential exit. We find that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, most investors use proxy advisors and believe that their information improves their own voting decisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Institutional investors, corporate governance, shareholder activism


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Date posted: March 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

McCahery, Joseph A. and Sautner, Zacharias and Starks, Laura T., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (July 06, 2015). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571046 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571046

Contact Information

Joseph A. McCahery
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Duisenberg School of Finance ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Zacharias Sautner (Contact Author)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH ( email )
Sonnemannstraße 9-11
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany
Laura T. Starks
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )
Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5899 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)
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