Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571456
 
 

References (42)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Agency Problems in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts


Jesse Edgerton


JP Morgan

October 7, 2011

AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper
FEDS Working Paper, 2011-15
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within firms that undergo leveraged buyouts. Quantile regressions indicate that these results are driven by firms in the upper 30% of the conditional jet distribution. Results thus suggest that executives in a substantial minority of public firms enjoy excessive perquisite and compensation packages.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 73

Keywords: Agency problem, corporate governance, executive compensation, private equity, corporate jet

JEL Classification: G34, G39, J33, J44

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Date posted: February 4, 2011 ; Last revised: October 31, 2011

Suggested Citation

Edgerton, Jesse, Agency Problems in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts (October 7, 2011). AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper; FEDS Working Paper, 2011-15; Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571456

Contact Information

Jesse Edgerton (Contact Author)
JP Morgan ( email )
270 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10027
United States
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