Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571663
 
 

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How Are Venture Capitalists Rewarded? The Economics of Venture Capital Partnerships


Murillo Campello


Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Rafael Matta


University of Amsterdam - Finance Group

April 7, 2010


Abstract:     
We develop a model showing how investors, venture capitalists (VCs), and entrepreneurs integrate into a venture capital fund (VCF). Investors' demand for VC services will depend on their beliefs about the accuracy of VC screening and their expected revenue without a VC. The quality of screening will depend on VCs' information, incentives, and expected profits. The model characterizes equilibrium prices that VCs charge for their services and the individual payoff schedules of VCs and investors as function of project cash flows. We calibrate the model using data from existing empirical studies and find results that match the management fees charged by real-world VCs and the industry returns. Our analysis provides new insights into the formation of VC-investor partnerships and suggests that the services provided by VCs improve capital market efficiency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Venture capitalists, project screening, capital markets efficiency, model calibration

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series





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Date posted: March 16, 2010 ; Last revised: October 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Campello, Murillo and Matta, Rafael, How Are Venture Capitalists Rewarded? The Economics of Venture Capital Partnerships (April 7, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571663

Contact Information

Murillo Campello
Cornell University ( email )
114 East Avenue
369 Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/Faculty-And-Research/Profile.aspx?id=mnc35

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
Rafael Matta (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www1.fee.uva.nl/pp/rmatta/
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