Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571740
 
 

References (19)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



An Empirical Investigation of Internal Governance


Rajesh K. Aggarwal


University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Huijing Fu


Texas Christian University

Yihui Pan


University of Utah - Department of Finance

December 26, 2013

AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) theorize that CEO rent extraction is constrained by subordinate managers. This internal governance works best when the relative contributions of CEOs and managers to output are balanced. Consistent with the theory, we find a hump-shaped relation between relative contributions and corporate investment, and between relative contributions and firm performance. These hump-shaped relations are stronger for firms with older CEOs, for firms more likely to promote insiders to CEO, for firms with non-founder CEOs, and for firms in growing industries. Other forms of governance do not diminish the importance of internal governance, and the results are robust to endogeneity concerns.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 18, 2010 ; Last revised: December 27, 2013

Suggested Citation

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. and Fu, Huijing and Pan, Yihui, An Empirical Investigation of Internal Governance (December 26, 2013). AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571740

Contact Information

Rajesh K. Aggarwal (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )
19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
Huijing Fu
Texas Christian University ( email )
Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States
817-257-7148 (Phone)
817-257-7227 (Fax)
Yihui Pan
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,094
Downloads: 444
Download Rank: 35,616
References:  19
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.422 seconds